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Abstract
Using examples from more than a dozen fisheries, we highlight the failures of
‘command control’ management and show that approaches that empower fishers with
the incentives and the mandate to be co-custodians of the marine environment can
promote sustainability. Evidence is provided that where harvesters share well-defined
management responsibilities over fish, and experience both the pain of overexploitation
and the gains from conservation, they are much more likely to protect fish stocks and
habitat. The key insight is that to maintain marine ecosystems for present and future
generations, fishing incentives must be compatible with long-term goals of
sustainability.3
Perspective
Incentive-Based Approaches to Sustainable Fisheries
Introduction
Marine ecosystems are in global decline (Pauly et al. 1998; Pauly et al. 2002; Schiermeier
2002; Myers and Worm 2003; Pauly et al. 2003). To prevent further overexploitation and
degradation many have proposed an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) that gives
greater weight to integrated management and emphasizes the importance of maintaining
ecosystem health for present and future generations (Ecosystem Principles Advisory
Panel 1999; FAO 2002; Garcia et al. 2003; Browman et al. 2004; Pikitch et al. 2004). We
strongly endorse the goals of ecosystem-based management, but contend that it will fail
to overcome the overharvesting of stocks and damage to habitat unless fisher incentives
(Hilborn 2004; Hilborn et al. 2005) are made compatible with long-term goals of
sustainability. We argue that what is required are incentive-based approaches to
sustainable fisheries (IAF) that empower fishers with the incentives and the mandate to
be co-custodians, with other stakeholders, of the marine environment.
Failures of ‘command and control’
Many countries use the ‘command and control’ approach to fisheries that focuses on
input restrictions and total catch limits. Such controls frequently fail to limit fishing effort
because fishers are able to substitute to unregulated inputs causing ‘effort creep’. Input4
controls also fail to instil a long-term perspective in fishers, or overcome the short-term
motivation to catch more even if it jeopardizes their future livelihood. For example, in the
North Sea cod fishery some harvesters oppose reductions in the total allowable catch
(TAC) despite the fact that the spawning stock is below a level that demands a harvesting
moratorium (European Environment Agency 2004). Such short-term behavior can have
catastrophic consequences — Canada’s Northern cod fishery, for instance, spectacularly
collapsed in the 1990s as a result of excessively high TACs (Grafton et al. 2000a).
The negative consequences of input controls, be they applied in traditional and single-
species management or with ecosystem approaches, is illustrated by the recent experience
in Australia’s federally-managed fisheries. In the past 10 years the Australian federal
government has committed US$60 million per year to fisheries research and ecologically
sustainable development, undertaken substantial buybacks of fishing effort, implemented
detailed scientific fishery management plans that incorporate strong stakeholder
involvement, and expanded its National Representative System of Marine Protected
Areas (McLoughlin and Findlay 2005). Despite such strategies, fishers have successfully
lobbied against recommended reductions in the TACs and other changes that might lead
to business failures in the short run. Such lobbying, and effort creep in input-controlled
fisheries, contributed to a three-fold increase in the number of Australian Federal
fisheries classified as overfished in the past 10 years (Caton and McLoughlin 2004).
Incentives for sustainability5
A growing body of evidence shows the benefits of IAF. In Oceania, for example, ‘no
take’ areas, territorial user rights and cooperative management have ensured sustainable
fisheries for centuries by allowing clans or families to control, for their benefit, reef and
lagoon areas (Johannes 1978). The success of traditional marine tenure systems suggests
that when harvesters share well-defined management responsibilities over fish, and
experience both the pain of overexploitation and the gains from conservation, they are
much more likely to protect fish stocks and their habitats. For instance, in the Tasmanian
abalone fishery — a state-managed fishery regulated by individual quotas since 1985 —
quota-holders with direct involvement in advising the regulator successfully lobbied for
large reductions in the total catch (Tasmanian Abalone Council 2003). The successful
rebuilding of the Icelandic herring stocks, through cuts in the TAC, were strongly
supported by industry because fishers wanted to protect the asset value of their harvesting
rights (Hannesson 1996). In the British Columbia (BC) sablefish fishery — managed by
individual harvesting rights since 1990 — fishers initiated and funded research on trap
escape rings that dramatically reduced juvenile capture and mortality. Since individual
harvesting rights were introduced in BC’s halibut fishery, harvesters fully fund dockside
monitoring that tags every fish and have modified their behavior so that discards of
undersized halibut have been reduced by 50% (Grafton et al. 2000b).
Fishing cooperatives
Incentive-based approaches can reward fishers for sustainable practices and provide
motivation to reduce or eliminate overcapacity and overharvesting. This does not6
guarantee sustainability, however, as all fisheries are subject to irreducible uncertainties
(Ludwig et al. 1993), but numerous examples show that both community and individual
harvesting, or territorial rights — coupled with decision-making responsibilities —
improve management (Ostrom et al. 1994; Shotton 2001; Dietz et al. 2003; Hannesson
2004).  For instance, purse seine fishers recently established a cooperative in Alaska’s
Chignik salmon fishery and in a 2002 survey of its members, 67% claim it has made
them financially better off, 100% state it has improved fish quality, and 87% consider it
has been either very or somewhat positive for the management of the fishery (Knapp et
al. 2002).
Harvesting rights
The key is to provide harvesters with long-term and secure rights that explicitly account
for interactions across stocks, and to also give fishers a participatory mandate in
management. Improved tenure, forcing harvesters to pay the full costs of fisheries
adjustments and providing fishers with decision-making responsibilities help to align
incentives with sustainability goals. Such approaches also reduce the need for
micromanagement and encourage more ‘bottom-up’ and participative processes (Lane
and Stephenson 2000). For example, in the New Zealand east-coast rock lobster fishery
the introduction of individual harvesting rights prompted commercial stakeholders to
initiate a locally focused fishing strategy. The industry successfully requested the
regulator to lower the commercial catch and to restrict harvesting to a shorter winter
period to make illegal fishing easier to detect (Breen and Kendrick 1997). Similarly, in
2001 the scientist contracted by the Canadian Sablefish Association (CSA), an7
organization of commercial fishers with individual harvesting rights, advised of rapid
declines in sablefish abundance.  Shortly thereafter, the CSA recommended to the
regulator that the total catch be immediately reduced as a precautionary measure.
Subsequent stock recovery that followed a decline in the TAC by almost 50% has
allowed CSA members to benefit from their conservation efforts.
Discards and by-catches
IAF seek to make fisher incentives compatible with long-term sustainability, but this is
not easy to achieve. Examples exist where fishers with individual harvesting rights have
dumped lower valued fish so as to maximize the value of their trip landings (Arnason
1994; Squires et al. 1998). However, such problems can be mitigated and adaptively
managed with appropriate incentives and instruments (Turner 1997). For instance, in the
BC groundfish trawl fishery — managed with individual harvesting rights since 1997 —
dumping of fish is recorded by observers on all vessels and is counted against individual
quotas. This quota reconciliation provides harvesters with the incentive to be much more
selective in their fishing practices. As a result, the ratio of at-sea releases to the landed
fish weight has greatly declined (Grafton et al. 2004).  Recently, fishers have, on their
own initiative, undertaken research that halved the fishing mortality of bocaccio rockfish
— a by-catch species for which harvesters do not have quota (Fisheries and Oceans
Canada 2004).  This protects their livelihood because, should the boccacio be identified
as a threatened species, groundfish trawl fishing could be prohibited.8
Overcapacity: buybacks and marine reserves
The potential payoffs from IAF include better protection of fish stocks and the
environment, increased returns to harvesters (Grafton 1996; Dupont and Grafton 2001;
Fox et al. 2003; Dupont et al. 2005), and reduced fishing capacity (Grafton et al. 1996;
Dupont et al. 2002; Turner and Weninger 2005).  These benefits arise because secure and
durable rights to fish, individually or communally, reduce ‘racing behavior’ that leads to
excess effort, substitution to unregulated inputs (Squires 1987; Kompas et al. 2004) and
lower overall net returns (Dupont 1990).  By contrast, ‘top down’ input controls promote
an ‘us versus them’ attitude with managers (Charles 1995)
 and frequently fail to limit
fishing effort (Townsend 1990). Consequently, ‘effort creep’ often obliges regulators to
implement operational constraints to ensure the TAC is not exceeded. Such controls, such
as a shorter fishing season, often aggravate the ‘race to fish’ and contribute to further
overcapacity (Clark 1982).
When overcapacity reaches a critical level regulators frequently resort to buybacks of
vessels or associated fishing licences. Often the direct costs of buybacks are borne by the
public purse, and not fishers themselves. Buybacks are only a short-term palliative for the
underlying incentive problem because, if they are successful in temporarily increasing the
returns to harvesters who remain fishing, higher profits encourage further investments
and effort creep (Weninger and McConnell 2000). As a result, the ability of buybacks to
reduce long-term fishing effort and help stocks recover is very limited (Holland et al.
1999) without a change in fisher incentives. For example, there were five buybacks at a
cumulative cost of several hundred million dollars in the BC salmon fishery over the
period 1970-2000. Despite such expenditures the average catch per vessel has fallen over9
the period and the buybacks have not provided a lasting solution to the chronic problem
of overcapacity (Grafton and Nelson 2004).
Alternative management approaches, such as marine reserves, can also be used to
protect fish stocks and habitat from overfishing that can arise from excess capacity.
Reserves can lead to increased abundance, size and biodiversity (Halpern 2003) and a
more fecund population (Palumbi 2004) within ‘no take’ areas and can potentially
increase harvests in exploited areas via fish migration (Roberts et al. 2001; Gell and
Roberts 2003).  ‘No take’ areas are particularly helpful in the face uncertainties (Lauck et
al. 1998) and can also promote resilience to shocks and raise profitability even when
harvesting is optimal (Grafton et al. 2005). Despite these benefits, reserves cannot
address all the problems in fisheries (Allison et al. 1998), nor do they provide fishers with
incentives to act more responsibly in terms of their harvesting practices.
Returns and subsidies
Transferability of harvesting rights, and the prices that they can command, induces some
fishers to exit and remove excess capital while increasing the returns of fishers who
remain. Nevertheless, high values for harvesting rights and concentration of quota are
viewed with concern by some fishers and managers. The possibility exists, however, to
limit the amount of harvesting rights owned by any one individual or company. A share
of the increased returns attributable to incentive-based approaches may also be captured
to reduce the entry costs for prospective fishers, or to collect revenues for the public
purse (Grafton 1995). To help cover management costs in the commercial geoduck
fishery, the State of Washington auctions the right to harvest the shellfish in defined areas10
for a season. These auctions generate revenues between $5-7 million/year that are used to
monitor harvesters, assess and enhance stocks, and to restore aquatic habitats
(Washington State Department of Natural Resources 2001).
Higher fisher returns with IAF allow for the possibility of fisher-funded monitoring
and additional data collection. Incentive-based approaches also reduce the motivation for
price supports, or vessel and gear subsidies that contribute to overfishing (Milazzo 1998;
Munro and Sumaila 2002). For example, Iceland and New Zealand have long-term
individual harvesting rights in many of their fisheries and their government financial
transfers represent less than 5% of the total value of their respective landings (Cox and
Schmidt 2002). By contrast, the total government financial transfers to fisheries regulated
with input controls are often much higher. For instance, in 1999 such transfers totalled
US$6 billion for all OECD countries and represented, on average, 20% of the total value
of landings (Cox and Schmidt 2002).
Sustaining ecosystems
By ensuring that individual and community incentives are compatible with broader social
values, fishers can promote sustainability. In New Zealand, for example, the fishing
industry has recognized the vulnerability to harvesting of the Fiordland environment —
listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. To address these concerns, an alliance of
conservation groups and commercial, recreational and native fishers — called the
Fiordland Marine Guardians (FMG) — developed a strategy to preserve environmental
quality with sustainable harvesting. It creates eight marine reserves and establishes the
FMG as a formal advisory body to the government. Without well-defined harvesting11
rights, and the incentives they engender, this successful balancing of interests and
responsibilities across stakeholders would have been impossible.
The FMG illustrate how incentive-based approaches provide opportunities to
mitigate the adverse consequences of fishing on habitats. Other potential examples
include instruments that proxy marginal habitat damage and target a level of habitat
quality so as to maintain both fish stocks and habitats for future generations (Holland and
Schnier 2004). The key insight is that correct incentives, engendered by appropriate
community, harvest or territorial rights, promote more sustainable fishing practices that
can help ‘turn the tide’ in fisheries.
Concluding remarks
Incentive-based approaches will not overcome all the negative trends in the world’s
oceans, but they will address many of the failures of  ‘command and control’
management that contributes to overfishing and unsustainable fishing practices. A
growing body of empirical evidence supports our conclusion that approaches that
empower fishers with the incentives, responsibilities, and the mandate to be co-
custodians of the marine environment promote good governance, help support healthy
marine ecosystems and can improve the economic performance of fisheries.
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